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Abstract
Second-order stochastic dominance answers the question “Under what conditions will
all risk-averse agents prefer x˜2 to x˜1?” Consider the following related question: “Under
what conditions will all risk-averse agents who prefer lottery x˜1 to a reference lottery
ω˜ also prefer lottery x˜2 to that reference lottery?” Each of these two questions is an
example of a broad category of questions of great relevance for the economics of risk. The
second question is an example of a contingent risk comparison, while the question behind
second-order stochastic dominance is an example of a non-contingent risk comparison.
The stochastic order arising from a contingent risk comparison is obviously weaker than
that arising from the corresponding non-contingent risk comparison, but we show that
the two stochastic orders are closely related, so that the answer to a non-contingent risk
comparison problem always provides the answer to the corresponding contingent risk
comparison problem. In addition to showing the connection between parallel contingent
and non-contingent risk comparison problems, we articulate a method for solving both
kinds of problems using the “basis” approach. The basis approach has often been used
implicitly, but we argue that there is value to making its use explicit, particularly in
indicating which new, previously unsolved problems can readily be solved by the basis
approach and which cannot.
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1 Introduction
In even its classical, von-Neumann-Morgenstern formulation, let alone its more recent ex-
tensions into non-expected-utility theories, the economics of uncertainty encompasses a large
number of seemingly disparate results. Because the economics of uncertainty is a technically
difficult field, and its results are proved in a wide variety of ways, a substantial effort has been
required to learn what is behind all of its major results. New results have been discovered
and worked out in a way analogous to hand-crafting by a skilled artisan.
We propose a long-term project, of which this paper is a bare beginning, aimed at sys-
tematizing the economics of uncertainty. Systematizing involves clarifying connections among
results and categories of results, organizing what is known into arrays that reveal by conspic-
uous gaps what is yet unknown, and standardizing methods of discovery and proof. Perfect
order is neither attainable nor desirable, but organization and consolidation along one di-
mension can foster creativity along other dimensions.
This paper is the attempt to systematize the comparison of risks—especially results re-
lated to stochastic dominance. The problem of stochastic dominance is a standard one in
the literature of statistics, operations research and economics. In economics, it was first
examined by Hadar and Russel [1969], Hanoch and Levy [1969] and Rothschild and Stiglitz
[1970,1971]. In many instances, making an appropriate ordering of uncertain prospects boils
down to the problem of finding the restriction on the random variables x˜1 and x˜2 such that
Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(x˜1) (non-contingent comparison) (1)
for any function f belonging to some set P , where E denotes the expectation operator. For
example, if P is the set of increasing and concave functions, we get the well-known second-
order stochastic dominance order (SSD). If f represents a utility function, this order is useful
to determine whether a change in risk is unanimously rejected in the population of risk-averse
individuals. If f represents marginal utility, this order is relevant to determine whether risk-
averse and prudent agents unanimously increase their precautionary saving in the face of a
change in future income risks. Many other sets of functions P have been considered in the
literature, leading to other stochastic orders such as first-order (FSD) or third-order (TSD)
stochastic dominance. Gollier [2001] offers a short introduction to this literature.
In this paper, we investigate another type of stochastic dominance orders. Rather than
considering the problem expressed by equation (1), we consider the following problem: under
what condition on x˜1 and x˜2 can we guarantee that
Ef(x˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜) =⇒ Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(ω˜) (contingent comparison) (2)
for a given reference lottery ω˜ and for any f belonging to some set P . We include in this
type all other problems in which the first and/or second inequality is replaced by an equality.
Contingent risk comparisons have many useful applications. To start with, consider the
contingent problem parallel to SSD. Instead of requiring unanimity of preferences for x˜1 over
x˜2 in the whole population of risk-averters (a non-contingent risk comparison), we require
that all those who prefer x˜1 to the reference lottery ω˜ prefer x˜2 to ω˜ (a contingent risk
comparison). If x˜2 is SSD-dominated by x˜1, such a property is automatically satisfied. But it
is easy to find a change in distribution that satisfies the latter property without being SSD.
Thus, the contingent counterpart to SSD is weaker than SSD itself.
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Contingent risk comparison problems also have applications in marketing, industrial or-
ganization and political economy. For example, consider the marketing problem of a manager
of an insurance company who would like to change the offered contract without losing cus-
tomers. In this example, ω˜ is the random wealth of an agent who does not purchase the
contract, x˜1 is the random wealth with the initial contract (possibly with partial insurance
and an unfair premium), x˜2 is the new contract and f is minus the utility function. Given
risk aversion, does x˜2 need to be an SSD-improvement over x˜1? Not necessarily, because
the purchase of the initial contract allows him to extract some information about the risk
preferences of his customers. For example, if the initial policy has a premium much larger
than the actuarial value, only highly risk-averse agents will have purchased it. The insurance
company can design the new contract by using that information. The set of the company’s
customers is not a representative sample of the population of risk-averse agents. The contin-
gent parallels to first- and third-order stochastic dominance can be interpreted in much the
same way.
There are many other examples in which a signal (Ef(x˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜)) can be used to infer
the risk preferences of another agent. In industrial organization, there is the problem of
choosing a pricing and production policy (in the face of random demand) to keep a potential
competitor out of one’s market, given only the information that the potential competitor
rejected a particular risk in the past. In political economy, it could be quite important for a
political entrepreneur to know which other proposals the electorate will reject if a majority
of voters have been observed to vote against a particular risky policy. Any proposal that is
dominated by the rejected policy in a contingent sense will be unappealing to at least that
same (majority) group of voters, if not unappealing to an even larger majority.
Other illustrations of contingent risk comparison problems can be found in comparative
statics analysis. Consider for example the problem of selecting the scalar α1 that maximizes
H(α) = Eu(z0 + αx˜1). This is the standard portfolio problem where x˜1 is the return of
the risky asset and α is the demand for it. One can look for the condition under which all
risk-averse investors reduce their optimal exposure to risk in the face of a change in risk from
x˜1 to x˜2. Since H is a concave function, the problem simplifies to determining the condition
under which
Ex˜1u
′(z0 + α1x˜1) = 0 =⇒ Ex˜2u′(z0 + α1x˜2) ≤ 0, (3)
for any concave u. Eeckhoudt and Hansen [1980], Meyer and Ormiston [1985], Black and
Bulkley [1989] and Dionne, Eeckhoudt and Gollier [1993] obtained sufficient conditions to
this problem.
In this paper, we develop a general technique to solve all contingent risk comparison
problems of the type given in (2) in terms of the solution to the corresponding non-contingent
risk comparison problem of the type given in (1). We also spell out the technique that allows
one to solve many of the most important non-contingent risk comparison problems—the
basis approach. An important feature of expected utility is the linearity of the expectation
operator. As a matter of fact, if functions f1 and f2 satisfy condition (1), so does λf1+(1−λ)f2
for any λ in [0, 1]. The same property holds for contingent problems. Hence, if a simple
basis can be found for the set of functions P under consideration, the problem can be much
simplified. Such a basis exists for increasing functions, or for increasing and concave functions.
In section 2, we derive the general necessary and sufficient condition for contingent risk
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comparison problems and relate this condition to the parallel condition for non-contingent risk
comparison problems. In section 3, we systematize the basis approach for non-contingent risk
comparison problems. We show in Section 4 how our results can be applied to solve problems
examined among others by Jewitt [1987, 1989] and Athey [2002].
2 Contingent Risk Comparison Problems
Let F [a, b] denote the set of functions with domain in [a, b]. Consider a specific convex set C
of functions in F [a, b]. We say that x˜2 is C-dominated by x˜1, iff
Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(x˜1) for any f ∈ C. (4)
As mentioned in the introduction, to every non-contingent stochastic order, there exists an
associated family of contingent stochastic orders indexed by a reference situation ω˜. In many
applications, ω˜ will be degenerate. We say that x˜2 is Cω˜-dominated by x˜1, viz. x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1,1
iff
Ef(x˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜) =⇒ Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(ω˜) ∀f ∈ C. (5)
It is obvious that x˜2 is Cω˜-dominated by x˜1 if x˜2 is C-dominated by x˜1. In words,
the contingent stochastic order is weaker than the parallel non-contingent stochastic order,
independent of the reference situation ω˜.
To escape triviality, we hereafter assume that there is at least one function f in C such
that the condition Ef(x˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜) is satisfied. The main tool for analyzing condition (5)
is presented in the following Proposition, which is a rewriting of Farkas’ Lemma. Farkas’
Lemma has been very useful in game theory, operations research and general equilibrium
analysis. The authors are not aware of the existence of any use of this mathematical tool in
the economic theory of uncertainty, except in Jewitt [1986].
Proposition 1. Take any set C ∈ F [a, b] and any reference situation ω˜. Condition (5) holds
for any f ∈ C if and only if there exists a non-negative scalar m such that
∀f ∈ C : Ef(x˜2)− Ef(ω˜) ≤ m[Ef(x˜1)− Ef(ω˜)]. (6)
Proof: We provide two proofs of this result in the Appendix. The first proof is based on
the use of Farkas’ Lemma. The second proof is based on our Proposition 3, which is it-
self a consequence of standard results of linear programming (which are in turn themselves
consequences of Farkas’ Lemma). 
The sufficiency of (6) is trivial. Necessity is more complex. In section 3, we will present
an informal way of proving necessity that relies on the basis approach.
One key contribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970] is to associate with the SSD-integral
condition a generating process that transforms the initial distribution into the SSD-dominated
one — the concept of a mean-preserving spread. Can we find such a generating process for
contingent stochastic orders? To answer this question, observe that any non-negative real m
1This notation is consistent with the fact that x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1 ∀ω˜ =⇒ x˜2 C x˜1.
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can be expressed as the ratio q/p of two real numbers p ∈]0, 1] and q ∈ [0, 1] that can be
interpreted as probabilities. Then, replace m by q/p in condition (6), multiply both sides
of this inequality by p > 0 and add Ef(ω˜) to them. These operations yield the following
equivalent condition:
∀f ∈ C : pEf(x˜2) + (1− p)Ef(ω˜) ≤ qEf(x˜1) + (1− q)Ef(ω˜). (7)
We summarize this finding for characterizing contingent stochastic orders in the following
equivalent proposition.
Proposition 2. Take any convex set C ∈ F [a, b] and any reference situation ω˜. We have that
x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1 if and only if there exists a pair (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 with p 6= 0 such that (x˜2, p; ω˜, 1−
p) C (x˜1, q; ω˜, 1− q).
Again, the sufficiency part of this proposition is almost trivial, but the necessity one
is not. Moreover, three extreme cases are interesting to explore by using this proposition.
Suppose first that x˜2 is C-dominated by x˜1. This implies that x˜2 is also Cω˜-dominated by
x˜1 for all ω˜. This is seen from Proposition 2 by taking p = q, and by using the independence
axiom that supports the expected utility criterion. This reminds us that Cω˜-dominance is
weaker than C-dominance. Second, suppose that x˜1 is C-dominated by ω˜. In that case, x˜2
is Cω˜-dominated by x˜1 if and only if it is C-dominated by ω˜.2 Finally, suppose that x˜1 C-
dominates ω˜. In that case, x˜2 is always Cω˜-dominated by x˜1. This can be checked by using
Proposition 2 with q = 1 and p → 0. This shows that the interesting cases of contingent
dominance arise when x˜1 neither C-dominates ω˜ nor is C-dominated by it. Checking the
Cω˜-dominance in these cases requires searching for a pair (p, q) that satisfies the condition
described in Proposition 2. Notice that this proof shows that either p or q can be made equal
to 1 without loss of generality. In other words, it is never necessary have both 1−p and 1− q
nonzero.
Proposition 2 provides a generating process for any contingent stochastic orders of the type
given in (2). Namely, it is obtained by combining three operations from the initial lottery x˜1:
First, compound this lottery with the reference lottery ω˜, respectively with probability p and
1− p. Second, do any change to this mixture that is compatible with the generating process
of the parallel non-contingent problem. Third, if the obtained distribution is a compound
lottery yielding ω˜ with probability 1 − q and another lottery x˜2 with probability q, remove
the ω˜ branch of this compound lottery. This 3-step procedure generates a lottery x˜2 that is
Cω˜-dominated by the initial lottery x˜1. Furthermore, without loss of generality, it is possible
to skip either the first or third step. They are never both needed.
To illustrate, consider the initial lottery x˜1 ∼ (−2, 1/2; 4, 1/2) and suppose that the
reference lottery ω˜ is degenerate at 0. Consider contingent dominance for the set of increasing
and concave functions, i.e. the contingent dominance order parallel to SSD. As a first step,
compound lottery x˜1 with lottery ω˜, with respective probabilities 2/3 and 1/3. This yields
a new lottery (−2, 1/3; 0, 1/3, 4, 1/3). In the second step, add to this lottery the zero-mean
risk (−1, 1/2; 1, 1/2) conditional on realization 0. Ignoring the third step described above,
this process yields a lottery x˜2 that is distributed as (−2, 1/3;−1, 1/6; 1, 1/6; 4, 1/3). From
Proposition 2, we conclude that all risk-averse individuals who dislike x˜1 also dislike x˜2.
2Condition x˜2 C ω˜ is of course always sufficient for x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1. The necessity of this condition when
x˜1 C ω˜ comes from the observation that the right-hand side of inequality (7) is always smaller than Ef(ω˜).
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Notice however that it is not true that all risk-averse individuals prefer x˜1 to x˜2, i.e., it is
not true that x˜1 SSD-dominates x˜2. This can be seen by observing that the probability of
the worst outcome is larger with lottery x˜1 than with the other lottery.
Other forms of contingent stochastic dominance can be considered. For example, if both
inequalities in (2) are reversed, inequality (6) should be reversed. If we consider the condition
under which
Ef(x˜1) = Ef(ω˜) =⇒ Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(ω˜), (8)
the necessary and sufficient condition is again condition (6) with m being free to be negative
or positive. So in addition to the three manipulations of the original probability distribution
that have been presented above for the case m > 0, one can also make changes such that
x˜ = (p, x˜1; 1− p, x˜2) is C-dominated by ω˜. This is due to the fact that, when m is negative,
condition (6) can be rewritten
1
1+ | m |Ef(x˜2) +
| m |
1+ | m |Ef(x˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜). (9)
To sum up, we have been able in this section to transform the contingent risk comparison
problem into a more standard uncontingent risk comparison problem where x˜1, x˜2 and the
reference lottery ω˜ are compounded before being compared.
3 The Basis Approach for Comparing Risks
We have seen in the previous section that a full characterization of a contingent stochastic or-
der can be obtained by a standardized method if the corresponding non-contingent stochastic
order is itself characterized. In this section, we will survey from a unified perspective existing
results about non-contingent risk comparisons—each of which implies a parallel result for
contingent risk comparisons.
Consider a subset S of C such that C = conv(S), i.e. C can be expressed as convex
combinations of elements in S. Elements in S are extreme elements of the convex set C.3
We hereafter call S a “basis” for set C.
As is well-known4, since stochastic orders are additive in the function f , a necessary and
sufficient condition for (4) to hold is
Ef(x˜2) ≤ Ef(x˜1) ∀f ∈ S. (10)
To verify that condition (4) holds for any f in the large set C, it is sufficient to verify that this
condition holds for any function in the generating basis S. This simple property is implicitly
or explicitly used in all proofs of stochastic dominance integral properties that exist in the
literature. Athey [2002] extends this idea to other stochastic optimization problems.
It is noteworthy that the necessity of Proposition 1 can be obtained by using the basis
approach for comparing risks. Indeed, we obtained the following Proposition.
3An extreme element of a convex set is an element that cannot be obtained by a convex combination of
other elements in C.
4See for example Vickson [1975].
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Proposition 3. Suppose that S is a basis for the convex set C. Condition (5) holds for any
function in C if and only if it holds for any convex combination of any two functions in S.
Proof: Suppose that S ≡ {fθ(.) | θ ∈ Θ} forms a basis for the function set C. Thus, any
f ∈ C can be represented in set S by its transform H such that f(x) = ∫Θ fθ(x)dH(θ) for all
x. Note that x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1 is equivalent to the negativity of the following program:
max
H(.)| dH≥0,
∫
Θ dH(θ)=1
∫
Θ
[
E[fθ(x˜2)]− w(θ)
]
dH(θ)
s.t.
∫
Θ
[
E[fθ(x˜1)]− w(θ)
]
dH(θ) ≤ 0,
with w(θ) = Efθ(ω˜). Because the set of H that satisfies the constraint is bounded and
nonempty, a bounded solution exists to this problem. Both the objective function and the
constraint are linear in dH. Thus, this is a linear programming problem on the unit simplex.
The maximum value of the objective must be achieved by one of the two types of solution:
(A) a one-step function H with all the weight on one value of θ that satisfies the constraint
with strict inequality, or (B) a two-step function H that satisfies the constraint with equality.

We show in the Appendix that condition (6) is precisely equivalent to requiring that
condition (5) holds for any convex combination of any couple in the basis. Thus, if condition
x˜2 Cω˜ x˜1 is violated, there always exists a pair (f1, f2) of functions in S and a weighting
λ such that condition (2) is violated by λf1 + (1 − λ)f2. In other words, in order to verify
dominance of a contingent type, it is sufficient to look at all functions in C that are the
combination of only two functions in the basis. For comparison, to verify dominance of a
non-contingent type it is sufficient to look at all functions in the basis. Thus, it is more
complex to check a contingent stochastic property than the corresponding non-contingent
stochastic property. This additional complexity is kept to a minimum by using Proposition
2, which replaces the contingent comparison by a non-contingent one.
The smaller or more special S is, the more significant the reduction in the complexity of
the verification procedure (10) for non-contingent comparisons. In some cases, the minimal
basis is simple, while in other cases it is complex. Consider the following geometric analogy.
The extreme points of a cube are a set of 8 points, whereas the extreme points of a ball are
the entire sphere that is the surface of the ball. This distinction between simple and complex
minimal bases will be an important theme in our brief survey of non-contingent stochastic
orders. Let us begin with the well-known nth-degree stochastic dominance orders.
3.1 Nth-degree stochastic dominance orders
Consider first the convex set of all increasing utility functions that leads to first-order stochas-
tic dominance. As is well-known, the basis for such a set is the set of nondecreasing step
functions: fθ(x) equals 0 if x is less than θ and 1 otherwise. Condition (10) applied to step
functions leads to the familiar condition for FSD:
∫ b
θ dG2(x) ≤
∫ b
θ dG1(x), or G2(θ) ≥ G1(θ)
for all θ in [a, b], with Gi denoting the cumulative distribution function of x˜i.
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In the same vein, the convex set of increasing and concave functions has the set of “angles”
– or “min” functions – as a simple basis: bθ(x) = min(x, θ).5 The necessary and sufficient
condition here becomes∫ θ
a
xdG2(x) + θ(1−G2(θ)) ≤
∫ θ
a
xdG1(x) + θ(1−G1(θ)).
Integrating by parts and simplifying, one can see that this is equivalent to the well-known
SSD integral condition ∫ θ
a
(G2(x)−G1(x))dx ≥ 0. (11)
Notice that because an increasing and concave function is characterized by a positive
decreasing derivative, the basis for increasing concave functions is obtained by integrating
the functions of the basis for positive decreasing functions, i.e. the positive decreasing step
functions. The same integration technique can be used to build the basis for the set of
functions f whose N -th derivative has the same sign as (−1)N+1. Notice that any positive
function from [a, b] to R can be expressed as a convex combination of Dirac functions δx
with x ∈ [a, b]. Thus, a basis for functions f for which sgnf (N) = (−1)N+1 is composed
by functions fθ such that f (N)θ (x) = (−1)N+1δθ(x). For example, the basis for prudent
utility functions, i.e., functions whose third derivative is positive, is the set of continuously
differentiable functions with two pieces, quadratic to the left of θ, and linear to the right of θ.
If we restrict the analysis to the set of functions f with f ′ ≥ 0, f ′′ ≤ 0 and f ′′′ ≥ 0, the basis
is limited to those piecewise quadratic and linear functions where the left quadratic branch
is increasing and concave, and the right linear branch is increasing.
3.2 The stochastic order associated to the set of completely monotone
utility functions
Pratt and Zeckhauser [1987] and Caballe and Pomansky [1996] consider the set of “com-
pletely monotone” utility functions that are functions with all positive even derivatives and
all negative odd derivatives. Alternatively, the set of completely monotone functions is the
set of Laplace transforms of probability distributions (Feller [1971], p. 439). Thus, the basis
for this set is the set of (CARA) exponential functions. This set contains all familiar utility
functions, such as exponential functions, power functions, logarithmic functions and all con-
vex combinations of them. Since the set of exponential utility functions is the simple basis
for completely monotone utility functions, all completely monotone agents prefer x˜1 to x˜2 iff
all exponential agents do. If we limit the analysis to mean-preserving changes in distribution,
integrating this condition by parts twice yields∫ b
a
e−θt
[∫ t
a
(G2(x)−G1(x))dx
]
dt ≥ 0 ∀θ ≥ 0, (12)
which is a weaker condition than the SSD condition (11). This condition is expressed in
Proposition 4.1 in Caballe and Pomansky [1996].
5In a totally different framework, Leland [1980] uses the parallel property that “max” functions form a
basis for convex functions, showing that any convex (portfolio insurance) payoff function for an investor can
be achieved by purchasing put options in a complete set of option markets.
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3.3 The stochastic order associated with decreasing absolute risk aversion
Another set of utility functions that is often used is the convex set of increasing and concave
utility functions with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).6 Despite the fact that DARA
is a widely accepted assumption, there has been no satisfactory analysis of the stochastic
dominance order for this set of functions. Vickson [1975] provided a dynamic programming
algorithm to check whether two random variables can be ordered according to this stochastic
dominance property. The difficulty is that the basis approach does not help with the set of
DARA utility functions since there is no simple basis for this set. In the proof of Proposition
4, we show that the minimal basis is the set of piecewise CARA functions.
Proposition 4. The basis for the set of functions exhibiting nonincreasing absolute risk
aversion is dense in this set, i.e. for any DARA function there is a function in the basis
that is arbitrarily pointwise close to it. The same property holds for functions with decreasing
absolute prudence.
Proof: Let us consider three utility functions u1, u2 and u = `1u1 + `2u2, with `2 = 1− `1 ∈
[0, 1]. Let ri(x) = −u′′i (x)/u′i(x) be the index of absolute risk aversion of ui, and following
Pratt [1964],
r(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x) = `1u
′
1
`1u′1 + `2u′2
r1(x) +
`2u′2
`1u′1 + `2u′2
r2(x) (13)
and
r′(x) = `1u
′
1(x)
`1u′1(x) + `2u′2(x)
r′1(x)+
`2u′2(x)
`1u′1(x) + `2u′2(x)
r′2(x)+
−`1u′1(x)`2u′2(x)
`1u′1(x) + `2u′2(x)
(r1(x)−r2(x))2.
(14)
Assuming that u1 and u2 exhibit DARA, the left-hand side of this equation is the sum of three
negative terms, so u is DARA. This proves the convexity of the set of DARA functions. This
equation also shows that a function u which exhibits constant absolute risk aversion locally
at x cannot be obtained by combining DARA functions with different levels of absolute risk
aversion. So any piecewise exponential function with a decreasing stepwise absolute risk
aversion profile is an extreme element, i.e., it must be in the basis. Any DARA function can
be approximated by a sequence of such piecewise exponential functions, so proving something
for all DARA piecewise exponential functions is not much easier than proving it directly for
all DARA utility functions. 
The consequence of Proposition 4 is that the basis approach does not really simplify the
work of testing whether one lottery is unanimously preferred by another lottery by all DARA
individuals.
3.4 The stochastic order with respect to a function
Meyer [1977] examined the stochastic order for the set of increasing utility functions u which
are more concave than a given utility function u1. Specifically, take
6This set contains completely monotone functions as a subset. The corresponding stochastic order is thus
stronger than (12), but weaker than (11). See also Caballe and Esteban [2007].
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C ≡ {u : [0, 1[→ < | −u
′′(x)
u′(x) ≥ −
u′′1(x)
u′1(x)
∀x}.
It is easy to check that P is convex. Define
S ≡ {fθ : [0, 1[→ < | fθ(x) = min(u1(x), u1(θ)) ∀x, θ} ∈: [0, 1[}.
S is a basis for the set C of utility functions that are more concave than u1. This immediately
yields the following condition for the stochastic order associated with the function u1: (Meyer
[1977], Proposition 3)∫ θ
u1(x)dG2(x) + u1(θ)(1−G2(θ)) ≤
∫ θ
u1(x)dG1(x) + u1(θ)(1−G1(θ)), (15)
or, after integrating by parts,∫ θ
(G2(x)−G1(x))u′1(x)dx ≥ 0, ∀θ. (16)
When u1 is the identity function, we get back the first-degree stochastic dominance order.
Meyer [1977] obtained a symmetric result for the set of utility functions that are less
concave than u1. Finally, he considered the set of utility functions that are more concave
than u1 and less concave than u2. Like Vickson [1977], he provides a dynamic programming
algorithm to check whether two random variables satisfy the corresponding stochastic order.
Again, the outcome of Meyer’s algorithm may be understood by realizing that the minimal
basis for this convex set is the set of functions that piecewise have the same degree of concavity
as either u1 or u2.
Proposition 5. The basis for the set of functions which are more risk-averse than u1 and
less risk-averse than u2 is dense in this set.
Proof: The proof is parallel to the proof of Proposition 4. Using condition (13), it is apparent
that any function that piecewise has the same degree of concavity as either u1 or u2 must
be in the basis. Also any convex combination of such functions has a degree of risk aversion
between−u′′1u′1 and−
−u′′2
u′2
. Finally, any function that is in this convex set is arbitrarily pointwise
close to a function in the basis.
4 Applications to Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty
A standard problem in the economics of uncertainty is the effect of a change in risk on the
optimal exposure to it. Rothschild and Stiglitz [1971], Kraus [1979], Meyer and Ormiston
[1983,1985], Black and Bulkley [1989], Gollier [1995], Jouini and Napp [2008], Hollifield and
Kraus [2009], Jouini, Marin and Napp [2010] and Schlesinger [2013] analyzed the following
problem:7
αi ∈ argmax
α
H(α) = Eu(z(x˜i, α)),
7See also Baker [2009] who examine another optimality problem. Hau [2008] relates this question to the
problem of whether insurance is an inferior good.
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where z is a payoff function that depends upon the realization of random variable x˜1 and the
decision variable α. The portfolio problem is a special case of this problem, with z(x, α) =
z0 + α(x − r), x˜1 the return of the risky asset, r the riskfree rate and α the demand for it.
In many instances, α can be viewed as the level of exposure to risk x˜i. One can look for
the condition under which all risk-averse investors reduce their optimal exposure to risk in
the face of a change in risk from x˜1 to x˜2. Assuming the concavity of the objective function
and denoting the optimal solution under x˜1 by α1—i.e. E ∂z∂α(x˜1, α1)u′(z(x˜1, α1)) = 0—the
problem simplifies to determining the condition under which
E
∂z
∂α
(x˜2, α1)u′(z(x˜2, α1)) ≤ 0
is negative, whenever α1 satisfies the following first-order condition:
E
∂z
∂α
(x˜1, α1)u′(z(x˜1, α1)) = 0.
The above problem is a contingent risk comparison problem with fu(x) = ∂z∂α(x, α1)u′(z(x, α1)).
In many applications, α1 can be normalized to 1 because of the power of the universal quan-
tifiers over x˜1 and x˜2. Eeckhoudt and Hansen [1980], Meyer and Ormiston [1985], Black and
Bulkley [1989] and Dionne, Eeckhoudt and Gollier [1993] obtain sufficient conditions for this
problem.
To solve the standard portfolio problem, Rothschild and Stiglitz [1971] looked for the
necessary and sufficient condition for
E(x˜1 − r)u′(z0 + (x˜1 − r)) = 0 =⇒ E(x˜2 − r)u′(z0 + (x˜2 − r)) ≤ 0, (17)
for any concave u. Using the basis described in the previous section for the set of increasing
and concave functions, they ended up with the condition that∫ θ
a
(x− r)dG2(x) ≤
∫ θ
a
(x− r)dG1(x), (18)
for any θ in [a, b]. But as it appears from the use of the basis technique, this is the necessary
and sufficient condition for E(x˜2 − r)u′(z0 + (x˜2 − r)) ≤ E(x˜1 − r)u′(z0 + (x˜1 − r)) for all
concave u, i.e. this is the necessary and sufficient condition for the parallel non-contingent
problem. Gollier [1995] provides some counterexamples in which condition (18) is violated,
but condition (17) is satisfied. He did not explained the origin of the error made by Rothschild
and Stiglitz. This is by now clear: They considered contingent and non-contingent problems
equivalent. For a long time, all sufficient conditions to problem (17) that were proposed in the
literature, like those by Eeckhoudt and Hansen [1980] and Meyer and Ormiston [1985], sat-
isfied the overly restrictive condition (18). The first authors to provide a sufficient condition
that violated condition (18) were Black and Bulkley [1989], followed by Dionne, Eeckhoudt
and Gollier [1993]. But these authors did not realize the incompatibility of their sufficient
condition with the Rothschild and Stiglitz condition (18) that Rothschild and Stiglitz claimed
to be necessary.
Our results can be directly applied to this problem, where u is in the monotonic set,
monotonic and concave set, completely monotonic set, etc. This is left as an exercise for the
reader. Gollier [1995] solved the problem in the case of concave utility functions by defining
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the concept of “central dominance”. The distribution G2 of returns is centrally dominated
by the distribution G1 of returns, i.e., it reduces the demand for the corresponding asset by
all risk-averters, if and only if there exists a constant m such that∫ θ
a
(x− r)dG2(x) ≤ m
∫ θ
a
(x− r)dG1(x) (19)
for any θ in [a, b]. Applying Proposition 2, central dominance is obtained by compounding a
change in risk in return that satisfies the Rothschild-Stiglitz’s condition (18) with a degenerate
random variable taking value r. Tzeng [2001] examines the case of prudent decision makers.
Landsberger and Meilijson [1993] considered the problem of determining the stochastic
dominance condition under which all risk-averse investors reduce their demand for the risky
asset when its returns undergo a change in distribution, independent of the riskfree rate.
Gollier [1997] obtained the necessary and sufficient condition, which can easily be obtained
as follows: portfolio dominance holds iff
∀r : Ex˜1u
′(z + x˜1)
Eu′(z + x˜1)
= r =⇒ Ex˜2u
′(z + x˜2)
Eu′(z + x˜2)
≤ r, (20)
or, equivalently,
Ex˜2u′(z + x˜2)
Eu′(z + x˜2)
≤ Ex˜1u
′(z + x˜1)
Eu′(z + x˜1)
. (21)
Condition (21) neatly summarizes the implications of condition (20) holding for all r. How-
ever, (21) is not linear in u, so to apply the basis approach, rewrite (20) in the linear form
∀r : E [x˜1u′(z + x˜1)− ru′(z + x˜1)] = 0 =⇒ E [x˜2u′(z + x˜2)− ru′(z + x˜2)] ≤ 0. (22)
By the linear programming argument of Proposition 3, we know that if condition (22)—or
the equivalent condition (21)—fails, it must fail at some convex combination of two functions
of the generating basis of P . For the set of monotonic, concave functions u, this yields the
following necessary and sufficient condition for portfolio dominance: ∀θ1, θ2, ∀φ ∈ [0, 1] :
φ
∫ θ1 xdF2(x) + (1− φ) ∫ θ2 xdF2(x)
φF2(θ1) + (1− φ)F2(θ2) ≤
φ
∫ θ1 xdF1(x) + (1− φ) ∫ θ2 xdF1(x)
φF1(θ1) + (1− φ)F1(θ2) . (23)
Gollier and Schlesinger [2002] explore the impact of a change in risk in the return of
an asset on its equilibrium price rather than on its demand by a risk-averse investor. In
an economy with a risk-averse representative agent, they show how to use the technique
of contingent comparisons to solve this problem. In another vein, Gollier [2011] used a
contingent comparison technique to examine whether people who are more ambiguity-averse
have a smaller demand for assets with an ambiguous distribution of returns. Suppose that the
risky asset has a return x˜ whose distribution depends upon an unknown parameter θ. Gollier
[2011] shows that this comparative static analysis requires determining whether Eu(z0 + x˜θ)
and Ex˜θu′(z + x˜θ) are comonotone. This is another example of a contingent comparison
that is similar to the one that we discussed in this section. The same technique is useful
to characterize the notion of decreasing aversion under ambiguity (Cherbonnier and Gollier,
[2015]).
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5 Greater Risk Aversion and the Preservation of Preference
Orders
The technique presented in this paper is useful to provide a simple way to solve two problems
raised by Jewitt [1987,1989]. Consider any two random variables x˜1 and x˜2, with cdf F1 and
F2 respectively. Let G denote F2 − F1. Under which condition can we guarantee that if an
individual u ∈ C prefers x˜1 to x˜2, so does any individual v who is more risk-averse than u?
This problem is technically equivalent to determining whether, for any u ∈ C,
Eu(x˜2) ≤ Eu(x˜1) =⇒ Eφ(u(x˜2)) ≤ Eφ(u(x˜1)) (24)
for any function φ which is increasing and concave. Jewitt [1987,1989] solves this problem
when C is the set of increasing functions, and when C is the set of increasing and concave
functions. We show hereafter that his results can be obtained by applying directly the basis
technique together with Proposition 3. Despite not being in the form (5), this problem can
be solved by the same technique as before. Indeed, observe that, using the basis technique,
problem (24) can be rewritten as∫ b
a
u(t)dG(t) ≤ 0 =⇒
∫ θ
a
u(t)dG(t)− u(θ)G(θ) ≤ 0 (25)
for any θ ∈ [a, b].
5.1 When C is the set of increasing functions
Suppose first that C is the set of increasing functions. Using the same proof as for Proposition
3, condition (25) holds for any u ∈ C if and only if it holds for any two-step function, i.e. for
u(z) =

0, if z ≤ c;
uc, if c < z ≤ d;
ud, if d < z;
(26)
with 0 ≤ uc ≤ ud. If c and d are on the same side with respect to θ, condition (25) is trivially
satisfied. If c ≤ θ ≤ d, this condition can be rewritten as
(G(d)−G(c))uc −G(d)ud ≤ 0 =⇒ −G(c)uc ≤ 0. (27)
The contrapositive is equivalent to
−G(c)uc > 0 =⇒ (ud − uc)G(d) < −ucG(c). (28)
Since ud − uc can be made as large as desired, this is equivalent to the condition
G(c) < 0 =⇒ G(d) < 0, (29)
for all c ≤ d. This is the single-crossing condition obtained by Jewitt [1987] that has been
refined by Athey [2002]: The preference ordering between F1 and F2 is preserved by greater
risk aversion if and only if F2 crosses F1 only once, from below. The “only if” means that
if F2 crosses F1 more than once, then one can obtain an increasing utility function u and a
concave transformation function φ such that F1 is prefered to F2 by u, but F2 is prefered
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to F1 by the more risk-averse v = φ(u). Athey [2002] makes this statement more precise by
introducing the concept of an “identified pair of sufficient conditions relative to a conclusion”.
Notice that our technique of proof shows us how to build a counter-example. Just take a
two-step utility function for u and a one-step utility function for v.
5.2 C is the set of increasing and concave functions
Suppose now that C is the set of increasing and concave functions. Integrating by parts,
condition (25) can be rewritten as∫ b
a
u′(t)G(t)dt ≥ 0 =⇒
∫ θ
a
u′(t)G(t)dt ≥ 0 (30)
for all θ ∈ [a, b]. Using the same proof as for Proposition 3, condition (30) holds for any
u ∈ C if and only if it holds for any piecewise linear function with three segments, i.e. for
u′(z) =

u′c, if z ≤ c;
u′d, if c < z ≤ d;
0, if d < z;
(31)
with u′c ≥ u′d ≥ 0. Define function ψ as ψ(z) =
∫ z
a G(t)dt. Again, if c and d are on the same
side with respect to θ, condition (30) is trivially satisfied. If c ≤ θ ≤ d, this condition can be
rewritten as
ψ(c)u′c + (ψ(d)− ψ(c))u′d ≥ 0 =⇒ ψ(c)u′c + (ψ(θ)− ψ(c))u′d ≥ 0, (32)
or equivalently,
ψ(d) ≥ −u
′
c − u′d
u′d
ψ(c) =⇒ ψ(θ) ≥ −u
′
c − u′d
u′d
ψ(c), (33)
for any c ≤ θ ≤ d, and any u′c ≥ u′d ≥ 0. Because (u′c − u′d)/u′d can be made as large as
desired, this condition is equivalent to the conditions that [a] ψ crosses the horizontal axis
only once, from above, and that [b] ψ is non-increasing when it is negative. This is the result
obtained by Jewitt [1989]. Notice that Jewitt uses a piecewise linear function with three
segments to prove the necessity of the condition, as we do here.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have relaxed the standard stochastic order relations by requiring a preference
condition to be satisfied only for a subset of the population that satisfies another preference
condition. The technique we have developed is particularly useful in comparative statics
analyses. We have shown that these new stochastic orders can easily be derived from the
standard non-contingent ones by considering mixtures of distributions.
We have also explained why the literature on stochastic dominance is weak when consider-
ing sets of utility functions other than those defined by the signs of the first n derivatives. It is
because almost all of the results in this literature implicitly rely on the basis approach. While
simple bases exist for sets of utility functions defined by the signs of the first n derivatives,
14
no simple basis exists for other convex sets, such as the intuitively appealing set of decreasing
absolute risk aversion (or the set of decreasing absolute prudence) utility functions.
Finally, notice that, using the basis approach, all contingent problems of the type given
in (2) can be rewritten as
Ef(x˜1, θ˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜, θ˜1) =⇒ Ef(x˜2, θ˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜, θ˜1), (34)
for any distribution H of a random variable θ˜1, with f(., θ) ≡ fθ(.). A dual problem is the
following:
Ef(x˜1, θ˜1) ≤ Ef(ω˜, θ˜1) =⇒ Ef(x˜1, θ˜2) ≤ Ef(ω˜, θ˜2), (35)
for any random variable x˜1. This dual problem—comparing utility functions instead of
random variables—is analyzed in a closely related paper (Kimball and Gollier [1995]).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 based on Farkas’ Lemma
Here is the version of the Farkas’ Lemma that we will use here (Gale, Kuhn and Tucker
(1951), Lemma 1 on page 318).
Lemma 1. (Farkas’ Lemma) Let A ∈ Rk×` and b ∈ Rk.The following two conditions are
equivalent:
1. ∀y ∈ Rk : Aty ≤ 0 ⇒ bty ≤ 0;
2. ∃x ∈ R` : x ≥ 0 and Ax = b.
Let S be the generating basis of the convex set C. To simplify the analysis, suppose
that there is a finite number k > 0 of element in this basis, i.e., S = {fθ|θ = 1, ..., k}. This
means that any function f ∈ C can be expressed as a convex combination of functions in S.
Technically, this means that for any f ∈ C, there exists a vector y ∈ Rk such that y ≥ 0 and
f(x) = ∑kθ=1 yθfθ(x).
Let fθ,j denote E[fθ(x˜j)− fθ(ω˜)]. Condition (5) can then be rewritten as follows: for all
y ∈ R`,
k∑
θ=1
fθ,1yθ ≤ 0 and ∀θ ∈ 1, ..., k : −yθ ≤ 0 ⇒
k∑
θ=1
fθ,2yθ ≤ 0. (36)
This condition can be rewritten as condition 1 of Lemma 1 above with ` = k + 1, bt =
(f1,2, f2,2, ..., fk,2) and
At =

f11 . . fk1
−1 0 . 0
0 . . .
. . . 0
0 . 0 −1
 .
Applying Lemma 1 implies that this is equivalent to the condition that there exists a vector
(x0, x1, ..., xk) ≥ 0 such that for all θ ∈ {1, ..., k},
x0fθ,1 − xθ = fθ,2. (37)
This condition is equivalent to the property that there must exist a scalar x0 = m ≥ 0 such
that for all θ ∈ {1, ..., k},
fθ,2 ≤ mfθ,1. (38)
Because S is a basis for the convex set C, this is in turn equivalent to the condition that
∀f ∈ C : Ef(x˜2)− Ef(ω˜) ≤ m[Ef(x˜1)− Ef(ω˜)]. (39)
This is condition (6). 
Proof of Proposition 1 based on Proposition 3
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This alternative proof is based on Proposition 3, which states that condition (5) holds for
any function in C if and only if it holds for any convex combination of any pair of function
in its generating basis S. Take any f1 and f2 in S and denote fij for E[fi(x˜j)− fi(ω˜)]. We
would like to prove that condition (6) if and only if
λf11 + (1− λ)f21 = 0 (40)
implies
λf12 + (1− λ)f22 ≤ 0, (41)
for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and any (f1, f2) in S2.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that f21 > 0 > f11.8 Eliminating λ from
(41) by using equality (40) makes the above equation equivalent to f12f21 ≤ f22f11, or
f12/f11 ≥ f22/f21 for any (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ2 such that f21 > 0 > f11. This is equivalent to the
property that
min
f1∈S|f11<0
f12
f11
≥ max
f2∈S|f21>0
f22
f21
. (42)
It must be the case that the left-hand side of the above inequality is nonnegative (otherwise
x˜2 6Cω˜ x˜1). Thus, there is a nonnegative m such that
f12
f11
≥ m ≥ f22
f21
for any f1 and f2 such that f21 > 0 > f11. Hence,
f12 ≤ mf11 and f22 ≤ mf21. (43)
Expanded,
Ef(x˜2)− Ef(ω˜) ≤ m[Ef(x˜1)− Ef(ω˜)] ∀f ∈ S. (44)
Using the basis approach, this is equivalent to requiring that
Ef(x˜2)− Ef(ω˜) ≤ m[Ef(x˜1)− Ef(ω˜)] ∀f ∈ C. (45)
This is condition (6). 
8The case f21 = f11 = 0 leads to the necessary conditions f22 ≤ 0 and f12 ≤ 0. This implies the necessary
condition (43) trivially.
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